



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

P. 473, l. 39. mitleren for mittleren.

P. 486, l. 23. Seht for Steht.

P. 515, l. 9. psychiologischer for psychologischer.

P. 586, l. 19. beeinflusst for beeinflusst.

Kommt is generally printed kömmt. Pp. 48 and 269 it appears without the umlaut.

PAUL R. POPE.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY.

Eine neue Faust-Erklärung by Hermann Türck. 2 ed. Berlin, 1901 (O. Elsner).

Türck's new explanation of *Faust* exemplifies once more Loeper's saying, that Goethe's *Faust* is differently reflected in each epoch. It seems to be a fact that each generation interprets *Faust* according to its own ideals, and it has been demonstrated over and over again that this tendency is latent even in our days, at a time when objectivity is considered the first requisite of investigation.

The book is an application and working out of the ideas which the author had laid down in his previous treatises *Der geniale Mensch* (1897) and *Das Wesen des Genies* (1888). This chronology is significant: Türck approaches Goethe's *Faust* with a preconceived and definite philosophy of life, a frequent almost unavoidable but nevertheless lamentable circumstance.

His philosophizing centers about the two conceptions *Genie* and *Philister*. Historically and as to significance the former is with him of primary importance, the second being simply the negation of the first. *Genie* has according to the most frequent definition three characteristics: 1, objectivity as regards the world; 2, genuine productivity; 3, recognition of the ideal world, of the Eternal. Of these three points, the second is the most important. Objectivity comprises a thorough knowledge of the world, an absolute contempt of it, and the renunciation of all hope of realizing peace in it. Again only that productivity is genuine which has permanent results. And what have we to understand by the recognition of the Eternal? Türck emphasizes: no special creed. It is, in short, the Hegelian pantheism which he has in mind, the consideration of the world as the temporary manifestation of the Infinite in finite garb. Thus we get the definition: the *Genie* is productive, wise, resigned, and

humble. Its exact counterpart is the *Philister*; he is dominated by the two emotions of fear and hope which are summed up by Türck in the term *Sorge*. Under these two heads he would bring mankind, and in so doing he considers himself in accordance with Goethe (in *Gespr. m. Eck.* 1828, *Max. und Refl.*, *Zahme Xenien*, *Faust*) and with Spinoza's division into the free and the passive.

Concerning his interpretation of *Faust*, Türck can claim to be original in two points: in his general method and in his definition of Faust's character. As to the first he does not avail himself of the well-established historico-critical method; he does not differentiate individual strata in *Faust*, and in this he goes back to the obsolete philosophical interpretation. Türck's lack of historical sense and disregard to the genesis of the drama which he interprets is indeed remarkable. But he is not less original in the following. Heretofore the starting-point of elucidation has either been the prologue, or each stratum has been explained out of itself; Türck starts from the close of the drama, from the fifth act of the second part.

As the vantage-point from which to introduce his theory of the *geniale Mensch* into *Faust*, he chooses the words of Mephistopheles in the II. part, 5. act, ll. 11587-93.¹ Faust dies with the words: 'Im Vorgefühl' etc., whereupon Mephistopheles remarks: 'Den letzten, schlechten, leeren Augenblick' etc. These lines have always been difficult to reconcile: How can Mephistopheles call a moment 'schlecht' and 'leer,' which to Faust seems glorious? Which is right?

Here, at this point, Türck begins his new explanation of Faust's career and character; it centers about the two conceptions *Genie* and *Magie*, with their counterparts *Philister* and *Sorge*. At the moment, when Care blinds Faust, the process is closed which began with the appearance of the four women (l. 11384). Faust's blinding has a symbolical significance. His physical degeneration is parallel to a spiritual degeneration. The question arises: what has Faust become and what was he before? Türck answers: he is changed from a *Genie* to a *Philister*. Here we reach the centre of his exegesis. Türck does not believe in any gradual purification of Faust; on the contrary, he assumes that the

¹ According to Thomas' enumeration.

latter finally falls. Faust is essentially a *Genie*. His striving for the Eternal, Türck finds, is expressed in the prologue, in ll. 455 ff., 614 ff., 634 ff., 652, 1810 ff. and elsewhere. Further, Faust is dissatisfied and resigned, full of vague longings. In this condition we find him in the first soliloquy. He has looked at the world in the conventional manner in spite of his innate genius. Up to this time he has been a semi-*Philister*; now he determines to stand upon his own feet, to trust his own genius. This determination is first suggested in l. 377, where the word *Magie* symbolizes genius. The result of the decision is the emancipation of Faust from fear and hope (ll. 369-70). Faust does not persuade himself further (ll. 371-73); he recognizes that a genius cannot control his fate (ll. 454-55). Fear and hope suggest themselves to anyone under such conditions (ll. 640-51). But the genius does not resign itself to these feelings; it cannot perish on account of its indomitable vitality. So for Faust nothing remains but 'eine Tätigkeit auf gut Glück.' But since productive work must often, in order to accomplish its end, be destructive, genius often is obliged to make use of the evil in the world; so Faust enters into companionship with Mephistopheles. He storms life furiously, being productive in 'Liebesgenuss,' 'Schönheitsgenuss,' and 'Tatengenuss.' He remains a true genius, resigned, humble, wise, and energetic, never attaching any importance to the goods of the world, until he enters upon old age. Now everything changes. What he has up to this time treasured as a symbol of the Eternal he now finds 'personally significant.' He becomes conceited; he believes in the efficacy of the human will and sees in such an insignificant work as the draining of a marsh a great undertaking. At last he is wholly satisfied. Mephistopheles formally wins the wager; but since Faust remained a genius almost to the end of his life he still has hope of final salvation.

To sum up Türck's interpretation: in the Faust-drama Goethe describes the life and fate of the genius, utilizing the Faust legend. All is symbolic: Faust looks at the world as a symbol of the Infinite, and his own words are symbolic of his inner life; not only is for Faust, the man, the world a fleeting vision, but the drama itself is a symbol. The æsthete Friedrich Vischer, in his brilliant satire on Goethe's *Faust*, divides the extremists in Faust interpretation into two parties, the 'Sinnhuber' and the 'Stoffhuber.' If

we may apply these terms to the present case, then *Türck* must be placed in the first class. He is a 'Sinnhuber' of the extremest type.

The principal difference between this new and the common explanation consists in the following. In the latter, *Faust's* career is divided into two parts (before and after the night of Easter Sunday); *Türck* makes three divisions, adding the degeneration at the close of the second part. According to the old version *Faust's* life is destined to end in a purification, while in *Türck's* view he does not develop until his sudden fall; thus the second part is divided into two entirely different sections. Finally, the tendency of the old explanation is to interpret *Faust's* character by referring to each stratum of the drama; *Türck*, with sublime disregard to its genesis, recognizes only one *Faust*.

Every new theory which is in the least a serious one is serviceable to science, and according to this principle *Türck* is entitled to a hearing. It is, however, not probable that his theory will be widely accepted. A more detailed criticism of his views is of course not possible within the limits of this review; only a few points may be touched upon.

The names *Genie* and *Philister*, it seems to me, are badly chosen. *Türck's* *geniale Menschen* are *Tatmenschen* if not *Gewaltmenschen*. This becomes evident from his definition of genius as well as from the personages whom he chooses as types. It is true, Napoleon I and Bismarck are mentioned as geniuses par excellence together with Buddha, Christ, and Goethe; but the stress is laid on the first two. What was the chief characteristic of a Napoleon I? Certainly love for activity and power; impulse toward action, however, is rooted rather in the will than in the intellect. The terms *Genius*, *genial* refer, primarily, to intellectual greatness, while will-power is best expressed in German by such words as *gewaltig* or *titanisch*. The use of the notion *Philister* for a being moved by hope and fear, is especially unfortunate.

But is *Faust* really a genius, as *Türck* understands the word? To answer this question completely would mean to attack the deepest problems of *Faust* exegesis. But this much may be taken as certain. If we explain *Faust's* life from the standpoint of the prologue, then, it is true, he never seems to be satisfied. This would answer one side of the character of the *Türck* genius. But what

about its chief characteristic, the genuine productivity? What lasting work has Faust done when one leaves out the work along the ocean dikes, which falls in the time of his degeneration? It may be that Goethe at one time wished Faust to develop into a Türck-genius. In some passages (ll. 1663, 1750-59 and others) Faust is filled with a vague impulse to throw himself into a life of work and activity; but he is without any resignation; he expects pain and pleasure, happiness and sorrow.

Türk offers a nice solution of the difficulty in the fifth act of the second part. On the other hand the poetical beauty of Faust's last words would militate against the theory of his spiritual degeneration. No *Philister* speaks like that.

Nowhere does Türk's lack of historical sense and philosophical acuteness become more conspicuous than when he identifies his classification of mankind with that of Spinoza. He refers to Spinoza's saying: the more active a thing is, the more perfect it is and the more reality it possesses. But what does Spinoza mean by activity? Surely not Türk's genuine productivity. According to Spinoza the human mind is active when it has adequate ideas; all its passion consists in confused ideas. The essence of the mind is thought; volition is not only dependent on cognition, but at bottom identical with it. The highest good and the highest blessing is the knowledge and love of God, the *amor dei intellectualis*. In short, Spinoza's ethics is intellectualistic; his ethical ideal corresponds to the third element in Türk's definition, to the recognition of the Eternal which, as has been pointed out, is only of secondary importance in Türk's conception of genius.

PAUL REIFF.

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY.

Geschlechtswandel der Substantiva im Deutschen mit Einschluss der Lehn- und Fremdworte. Von Dr. phil. Albert Polzin. Hildesheim, Gebr. Gerstenberg, 1903.

The origin of grammatical gender and the changes in gender are having a revival of interest. Polzin's book is a distinct contribution to gender-change in German, but its value might perhaps have been increased, at least in a comparative way, if the author